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The Sovereign Debt Dilemma
When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in
the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to
do so, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure
which is both least dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to
the creditor.1
—Adam Smith

INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the securitization of
sovereign lending and the emergence of the secondary debt
market have transformed the contours of the global financial
system.2 Although public debt remains one of the most effective
tools to implement domestic economic policy,3 fundamental
changes in the design and structure of sovereign financing
have stymied the efficient restructuring of state obligations.4 In
particular, the late-1980s shift from syndicated bank lending5
to securitized bond financing6 has resulted in a vast
1

2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
468 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (1776).
2
Michael Wolfgang Waibel, Sovereign Debt Restructuring 6 (Winter 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://forschungsnewsletter.univie.ac.at/
fileadmin/user_upload/int_beziehungen/Internetpubl/waibel.pdf.).
3
For example, public debt can fund human capital development and
physical infrastructure projects, mitigate the effects of temporary economic downturns,
and redistribute “resources from future generations to the current one.” EDUARDO
BORENSZTEIN ET AL., AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LIVING WITH DEBT: HOW TO
LIMIT THE RISKS OF SOVEREIGN FINANCE 3-4 (2006).
4
A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1012 (2004).
5
Under the syndicated lending practices of the 1970s, relatively small
groups of commercial banks would extend credit to a sovereign “on identical terms . . .
pursuant to a single loan agreement.” Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of
the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on Inter-Creditor Relationships, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REV. 493, 500 (1988). From the perspective of the debtor, syndicated lending
facilitates the acquisition of funds, which would otherwise be unattainable from an
individual financing source. Likewise, for both lenders and borrowers, syndicate loans
promote efficiency by aggregating initial negotiations and subsequent loan
administration into a single, collaborative endeavor. Id.
6
In response to the fallout from the Latin American debt crisis of the early1980s, United States Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady sought “to ‘securitize’
sovereign loans by converting loan obligations into bonds.” Philip J. Power, Sovereign
Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications for Future Restructurings,
OF NATIONS
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diversification of sovereign creditors and a substantial increase
in the collective action problems among them.7 This change,
combined with the lack of reliable enforcement regimes and
restructuring institutions, has led to a global sovereign debt
dilemma.8
In conjunction with the return of securitized bond
financing,9 the global debt crisis of the 1980s also spurred the
emergence of a secondary market in sovereign debt.10 To policy
makers and sovereign debtors alike, this new market presented
a host of challenges that were not present under previous
financing schemes.11 Accordingly, when subsequent financial
crises necessitated the renegotiation of sovereign obligations,
the syndicate loan restructuring model12 no longer functioned in
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2720 (1996). Under the so-called “Brady Plan,” syndicate
bank loans were pooled together and exchanged for debt-securities guaranteed by
United States Treasury Bills. Jessica W. Miller, Comment, Solving the Latin American
Sovereign Debt Crisis, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 677, 685-86 (2001). After repackaging,
the securities were sold in the public markets and the sale proceeds used to satisfy
outstanding sovereign loan obligations. Power, supra, at 2720. As a result of
securitization, individual bondholders replaced commercial bank syndicates. Id. at
2719. Although sovereign lending has evolved to include other types of bond
instruments, the securitization of debt remains the principle means of sovereign
financing today. Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture
Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 253, 261 (2003).
7
William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best
Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (2004).
8
Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1012-13.
9
Following the independence movement of the early nineteenth century,
newly sovereign nations in Latin America began to procure external financing through
government bond issues in European capital markets. BORENSZTEIN ET AL., supra note
3, at 63. After enjoying almost a century of heavy capital inflows, World War I brought
most sovereign financing to a halt. Id. at 63, 75-76. With the onset of World War II and
the resulting European capital controls, the United States replaced Britain as the
center of global capital. Id. at 76. By the time the credit markets thawed in the 1970s,
New York had emerged as the dominant capital market and syndicated lending had
replaced bond financing as the primary mode of sovereign borrowing. Id. at 74, 79.
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
Between 1982 and 1983, over fifteen countries declared that they would
fall into arrears or suspend payments on approximately $90 billion in foreign syndicate
loans. Power, supra note 6, at 2708 n.27. Due to the relatively small number of lenders
and the interconnected nature of the affected notes, principles of “shared sacrifice”
dominated the syndicate loan restructuring atmosphere. Id. at 2710. Accordingly, bank
advisory committees were formed to promote “equity among banks, . . . and . . . [make]
it harder for individual banks to hold out for special treatment.” Charles Lipson,
Bankers’ Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling in Sovereign Debts, WORLD
POLITICS, Vol. 38, No. 1 200, 212 (Oct. 1985). In accordance with these equity
principles, lenders were asked to extend gap financing to sovereign debtors equal to
their pro rata share of credit exposure. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or
Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L. J.
1043, 1058 (2004). As a temporary stopgap measure, bridge financing permitted a
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the fluid and dynamic secondary market.13 Initially, the
international debate centered on whether public institutions or
private actors should lead the call to restructuring reform.14
However, with the death of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism,15 independent, contractual remedies continue to
govern sovereign debt restructuring and will do so for at least
the foreseeable future.16
In 2002, soon after Argentina declared a $132 billion
public debt default,17 significant contractual reforms began to
permeate throughout the sovereign financing market.18 At first,
Mexico took center stage when it announced the first largescale sovereign bond issuance in New York to incorporate
collective action clauses (the “CACs”).19 By providing for the
supermajority modification of certain repayment matters,
CACs sought to curb the inefficiencies posed by the unanimous
debtor to make interest payments while creditors worked to reschedule the principal
due on the loan. Power, supra note 6, at 2709-10. Likewise, due to the discretionary
enforcement nature of the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, which
required lenders to accumulate additional reserves, federal banking regulators were
not above making “‘friendly’ calls” to incentivize uncooperative lenders to participate in
the restructuring process. Id. at 2713. In addition, cross-default clauses in the
syndicate loan agreements discouraged maverick litigation by requiring all legal
proceeds to be shared pro rata with fellow lenders. Anne Krueger, First Deputy
Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, Speech at the Economics Society
Dinner, The Evolution of Emerging Market Capital Flows: Why We Need to Look
Again at Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Jan. 21, 2002), available at
http://imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/012102.htm.
13
See infra Part II.B.
14
See generally LUCIO SIMPSON, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT, G-24 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN DEBT
RESTRUCTURINGS: LENDING INTO ARREARS, MORAL HAZARD, AND SUSTAINABILITY
CONCERNS, 1-9 (2006).
15
Under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund, the SDRM was
based on Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and sought to ensure the
“orderly . . . and rapid restructuring of . . . debt, while protecting asset values and
creditors’ rights.” Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign
Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 337-40 (2005); ANNE O. KRUEGER, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 4, 21 (2002).
16
See infra Part I.A.
17
Clifford Krauss, Argentine Leader Declares Default on Billions in Debt,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2001, at A1.
18
See infra Part III.
19
United Mexican States, Prospectus, at 7 (Dec. 4, 2002). Prior to Mexico’s
2003 issuance, unanimous action clauses (the “UACs”) governed the vast majority of
sovereign bonds issued pursuant to New York law. Under a UAC, the modification of
reserved matters cannot be effectuated without unanimous bondholder consent. As a
result, small factions of holdout creditors can derail the restructuring process. Sergio J.
Galvis & Angel L. Saad, Collective Action Clauses: Recent Progress and Challenges
Ahead, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 713, 714-15 (2004). Because CACs impair the ability of a
holdout creditor to derail debt rescheduling, they are generally regarded as a more
efficient means to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring.
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action clauses, which had previously dominated the market.20
Several months later, Uruguay followed with a similar debt
issuance that incorporated CACs along with aggregation
principles and a pseudo-trustee structure.21 In the event of a
debt restructuring, aggregation enables a supermajority of
bondholders to cram down the modification of certain reserved
matters across multiple series of bonds.22 Likewise, the weak
trustee structure underlying the notes provided bondholders
with a centralized figure that could both initiate collective legal
actions as well as distribute any resulting legal award.23
Although these contractual reforms pushed sovereign
financing forward, none provided a comprehensive solution to
the creditor holdouts that pose the sovereign debt dilemma.24
Under collective action theory, rational, self-interested
individuals will choose personal gain over the pursuit of
collective objectives.25 As a result, some form of coercion is
required to obtain the optimal aggregate outcome.26 In the case
of a sovereign debt default, the potential recoveries from
holdout-litigation motivate creditors to abstain from the
voluntary restructuring process.27 Without an indenture trustee
to strip bondholders of their right to pursue individual legal
remedies,28 the Mexican and the Uruguayan reforms have failed
to fully embrace effective contractual coercion.29 Given this
inability to efficiently coerce creditor cooperation, the holdout
problem will persist, and the sovereign debt dilemma will
remain.
Part I of this Note begins with a brief examination of
the primary differences between lending in the public and
20

Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1093.
República Oriental del Uruguay, Trust Indenture Filed April 10, 2004, 1315, 35-36 [hereinafter República Oriental, Indenture]; see also Galvis & Saad, supra
note 19, at 717.
22
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722.
23
República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 14; Galvis & Saad, supra
note 19, at 723-24.
24
See infra Part IV.
25
Indeed, “even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and selfinterested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest
or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group
interest.” MANCUR OLSON, JR, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965).
26
Id.
27
Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 259-60.
28
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1105; see also Galvis & Saad, supra note
19, at 723.
29
See infra Part IV.
21
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private spheres, as well as a cursory review of the current state
of sovereign debt. Part II explores the collective action
challenges that resulted from the rise of the secondary debt
market and the inability of public institutions to effectively
resolve this problem. Part III contends that the Mexican and
the Uruguayan models fail to adequately combat the
complexities of the holdout problem. To better address this
issue, as well as provide for greater efficiency in debt
restructuring, Part IV advocates for the inclusion of an
indenture trustee clause in subsequent sovereign financing
contracts.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS

A.

Differences Between Sovereign and Private Lending

To fully appreciate the role of holdout creditors and the
resulting sovereign debt dilemma, it is first necessary to
understand the fundamental differences between public and
private borrowing.30 In the context of private lending, creditors
have recourse to legal regimes that will enforce the payment
obligations of debtors.31 Similarly, bankruptcy institutions
protect distressed borrowers from financial dismemberment32
and ensure “equal treatment” among similarly situated
creditors.33 As a result, private financing schemes provide both

30

Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 10-12.
Id. at 11. In the sphere of private lending, the maxim pacta sunt servanda
continues to apply. Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the
Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1389-90 (2007). Accordingly, if a
debtor fails to comport with his or her promise to pay, courts will enforce this
obligation in accordance with debtor-creditor and contract law. Id.; see, e.g., Gerdes v.
Kennamer, 155 S.W.3d. 541, 546 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that a court may order a
judgment debtor to turnover property “subject to the debtor’s control” even though the
property is located outside of the United States) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 31.002(b)(1) (Vernon 1997)).
32
For example, the automatic stay provision of the United States Bankruptcy
Code “provides the debtor with relief from the pressure and harassment of creditors
seeking to collect on their claims” as well as “breathing space . . . to focus on its
rehabilitation or reorganization.” 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 362.03 (2005); 11
U.S.C.A. § 362 (2006).
33
Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-Out System, 16 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 57, 74 (1995). The equitable distribution of assets among similarly
situated creditors is a core principle of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 5 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY § 541.01 (2007). Accordingly, U.S. bankruptcy courts “should aim to
treat similarly situated creditors similarly.” Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477
(2004).
31
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debtors and creditors with access to legal authorities that will
enforce the reasonable expectations of the lending agreement.34
In the world of sovereign financing, however, things are
different,35 since creditors lack recourse to reliable enforcement
institutions when the borrower fails to pay.36 In the United
States, prior to the passage of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (the “FSIA”), sovereign debtors enjoyed an
unqualified immunity in both state and federal courts.37 With a
judiciary that recognized absolute sovereign immunity, lenders
relied solely on the President to compel payment from
recalcitrant sovereign debtors.38 Today, though the United
States Supreme Court has held that debt obligations are a
“commercial activity” no longer subject to sovereign immunity,39

34

Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus
Corporate Debt, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 986 (2007). “The assurance of protection from
the consequences of debtor default is a fundamental necessity in the commercial world,
whose order depends upon the predictability of the debtor-creditor relationship and the
realization of reasonable expectations.” E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Recent Developments in
Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 527, 657 (1980).
35
Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 11.
36
Id. In addition to the lack of enforcement mechanisms, secured lending is
usually not an option when contracting with a sovereign. Patrick Bolton & David A.
Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be
Structured?, 53 EMORY L. J. 763, 793 (2004).
37
Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1573, 1618 (2007). When the United States Supreme Court first examined
sovereign immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, the Court found “that the
sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by a
sovereign, that the questions to which such wrongs give birth are rather questions of
policy than of law, [and] that they are for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion.” The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812).
38
Clark, supra note 37, at 1618.
[E]arly Presidents embraced the role of chief negotiator by espousing and
settling claims of U.S. citizens against foreign nations barred by foreign
sovereign immunity. Presidents would decide, in their discretion, whether
and how to espouse such claims. Even if the President agreed to espouse a
claim, he retained wide-ranging discretion in disposing of it. He could
“compromise it, seek to enforce it, or waive it entirely.” . . . In the end,
whatever compensation the President secured for the claimant was almost
certainly greater than any amount the claimant could recover on his or her
own, since foreign sovereign immunity foreclosed access to U.S. courts.
Id. at 1627-29. Outside the United States, one of the most infamous attempts at
sovereign debt collection occurred in 1902, when the British and German navies fired
on the Venezuelan coast and threatened to invade unless the debts of their subjects
were paid in full. Likewise, it was not until 1907 that Luis Drago, the Argentine
politician, first espoused the doctrine that sovereign debt cannot justify an armed
conflict or occupation of a debtor state. See Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official
Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 CHI. J INT’L L. 333, 336-37 (2005).
39
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992).
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lenders continue to face daunting debt collection challenges.40
For example, because FSIA does not permit a creditor to seize
sovereign assets located outside of the U.S. border,41 sovereign
debtors have transferred assets out of the United States on the
eve of declaring default.42 Once these monies have exited the
country, the lender often remains without an effective means to
collect on the sovereign debt.43
When compared to commercial borrowing, sovereign
lending also carries a heightened expectation of breach.44 While
economic or political factors may give rise to a sovereign’s
default, the absence of realistic enforcement procedures
provides an incentive for nation-states to ignore debt
obligations even when they are able to pay.45 Rather than face
the political, economic, or social consequences of conservative
fiscal policies, sovereigns may choose instead to default
opportunistically.46 As a result, a common assumption
underlying the sovereign financing process is that the borrower
will inevitably fail to pay.47 Consequently, a primary challenge
for sovereign lenders is to devise a contractual mechanism that
will realize the reasonable expectations of the lender-borrower
relationship when the debtor inevitably defaults.48
In addition to the lack of effective enforcement
mechanisms, there is similarly no global institution to address
40

Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 11. For instance, two problems that
continue to plague sovereign debt satisfaction are: (1) the difficulty in identifying
sovereign property that is subject to execution, and (2) the inability to liquidate a
sovereign debtor. Id.
41
Jonathan C. Lippert, Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt May
Force a Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 21 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 14-15
(2008). Indeed, the scope of FSIA extends only to “property in the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2008).
42
In fear of creditor enforcement actions, Argentina removed assets from the
United States and deposited them in the Bank for International Settlements before
declaring a default in 2001. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 35.
43
In the majority of cases, the sovereign’s courts cannot seize the sovereign’s
assets. Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT’L LAW 103,
116-17 (2003).
44
Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in
the Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 692, 694 (2004). In addition, the
transaction costs of dealing in sovereign debt are higher than the costs of similar
corporate transactions. Gulati & Triantis, supra note 34, at 986.
45
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1048-49.
46
Id. Professors Fisch and Gentile argue that holdout litigation serves an
important role in frustrating the desirability of an opportunistic default. Id. at 1047.
Although this may well be the case, it remains to be seen whether such benefits are
outweighed by the restructuring disruptions that such creditors pose.
47
Id. at 1044.
48
Id. at 1090.
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the problem of sovereign debt restructuring.49 Whereas legal
tribunals can allocate the financial rights of debtors and
creditors in bankruptcy, sovereigns are not subject to domestic
insolvency proceedings.50 Although both academics and
multinational institutions have put forth proposals for the
creation of a global sovereign insolvency regime,51 these efforts
have failed to garner sufficient support for their
implementation.52 Most recently, Anne Krueger of the
International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”) called for the
formation of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (the
“SDRM”).53 However, due to pushback from both debtor and
creditor states, the SDRM was placed indefinitely on hold.54
With the rise of contractual approaches to sovereign debt
restructuring, the current prospects for a global sovereign
insolvency regime appear to be nil.55 As a result, lenders and
borrowers are left to develop their own contractual devices to
effectuate the efficient restructuring of sovereign obligations.
B.

History of Modern Sovereign Financing

The roots of the holdout problem in sovereign debt
restructuring can be traced to the years spanning the early
1970s to the early 1980s, when lending to sovereign debtors
experienced exponential growth.56 During this period, syndicate
loans57 from commercial banks in the United States and
49

Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 714. Although creditors and debtors can
currently enter into informal agreements under the supervision of the IMF through
Paris Club (sovereign creditors and sovereign debtors) and London Club (sovereign
debtors and private creditors) negotiations, this system is noncompulsory and has been
criticized for its inefficiency. Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1008-12.
50
See generally, Caroline Atkinson, Forget Sovereign Bankruptcy Plans
(2002), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=4584.
51
KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 4.
52
Dickerson, supra note 4, at 998.
53
KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 21.
54
Adam Brenneman, Comment, Gone Broke: Sovereign Debt, Personal
Bankruptcy, and a Comprehensive Contractual Solution, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 679
(2006).
55
Id.
56
For example, in the ten year period between 1973 and 1983, foreign debt in
Latin America increased by more than 700%. Miller, supra note 6, at 680 (quoting Roy
MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 395, 311 n.31 (1995)
(citing PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKI, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT 14 (1988))).
57
“A syndicated loan is one that is provided by a group of lenders and is
structured, arranged, and administered by one or several commercial or investment
banks known as arrangers.” STANDARD & POOR’S, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET 7
(2009), available at https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf.
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Western Europe functioned as the dominant source of financing
for sovereigns in the developing world.58 After the 1979 energy
crisis,59 however, the Federal Reserve Board (the “Fed”)
increased interest rates to combat growing domestic inflation,
and as a result capital flew from developing countries back into
the United States.60 In response to the Fed’s higher discount
rate, lenders in the United States hiked prime rates on
outstanding sovereign loans.61 To the sovereigns, this had the
detrimental effect of increasing both the nominal value of
interest payments as well as the real rate of interest on their
debt.62 Consequently, on August 22, 1982, Mexico became the
first nation of the 1980s financial crisis to announce that it
would be unable to service its outstanding loan obligations.63
Less than one year later, fifteen additional countries declared
58

Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1054; see also Power, supra note 6, at
2707. During this period, U.S. financial institutions were awash in deposits from oilexporting nations, Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1054, while an economic
downturn and rising inflation at home reduced the domestic demand for credit. Power,
supra note 6, at 2707. Given the surplus of petrodollar deposits and the rising price of
raw material exports from developing nations, commercial banks viewed sovereigns as
a justifiable credit risk. Id. Indeed, lenders believed “sovereign borrowers were immune
from bankruptcy risk and would not suspend debt servicing.” Alberto Gonzalo Santos,
Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Reduction for Latin American Sovereign
Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 74 (1991). As a result, financial institutions would
routinely ignore sound lending practices such as profitability analysis and investment
requirements. Id. at 73-74. To sovereign debtors, rising inflation in the United States
counteracted high interest rates, id. at 72, and also rendered the real rate of interest
negative for a few years, increasing the desirability of borrowing in U.S. dollars. Id. at
72 n.41. Encouraged by the liberal lending practices of U.S. banks combined with
highly favorable financing costs, many countries pursued unsustainable development
through excessive foreign borrowing at the expense of conservative fiscal policies. Id. at
74-75.
59
The overthrow of the Shah of Iran resulted in an energy crisis that doubled
the price of oil within a year. Jon H. Sylvester, Impracticability, Mutual Mistake, and
Related Contractual Bases for Equitably Adjusting the External Debt of Sub-Saharan
Africa, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 258, 264 (1992). Although some debtor nations are
petroleum producers (e.g., Venezuela), the vast majority are not. Id. at 264 n.30.
Accordingly, to compensate for the increased cost of petroleum products, sovereign
debtors borrowed more heavily from commercial banks. Power, supra note 6, at 270708. At the same time, however, global recession precipitated a reduction in gross
returns on the commodity exports that nations used to service their debt. Id. at 2708.
60
Santos, supra note 58, at 74-75.
61
Edward Cowan, Bank Lending Rate Set at Record 14% by Federal Reserve,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1981, at A1.
62
Power, supra note 6, at 2708.
63
Lee C. Buchheit, A Quarter of a Century of Sovereign Debt Management:
An Overview, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 637, 637 (2004). Although earlier in 1982 Argentina
suspended payment on $37 billion in foreign debt after its defeat in the Falkland
Islands War, “it was the Mexican default that shook the financial world.” RICHARD
JOLLY ET AL., UN CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT THINKING AND PRACTICE 142
(2004).
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that they too would fall into arrears or suspend payments on
approximately $90 billion in foreign debt.64
At the time of the crisis, many commercial banks had
extended loans to sovereign debtors in amounts that greatly
exceeded their capacity to lend.65 To avoid having to declare
significant balance sheet losses, commercial banks jointly
extended bridge loans to sovereign debtors, which permitted
them to make interest payments while creditors worked to
reschedule the principal due on the loans.66 Although creditors
with larger exposure to the debt crisis were more willing to
provide funds to engage in gap financing measures,67 peer and
regulatory pressures ensured cooperation even among the
smallest and most recalcitrant lenders.68 In addition to
austerity programs,69 the IMF also instituted policies
conditioning new loans on the ability of a nation to obtain
64

Power, supra note 6, at 2709 n.28; see also Steven M. Cohen, Note, Give Me
Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin American Debt Revolution, 10 U. PA. J. INT’L
BUS. L. 89, 97 (1988).
65
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1057. For example, in the United States,
nine of the nation’s largest financial institutions had loaned more than 250% of their
aggregate capital to sovereign nations. Id. Under United States banking regulations,
lenders had to declare a loan as non-performing if interest on the note was over 90days past due. Id. If the sovereign debtors defaulted on their loans, lenders would have
almost certainly faced bankruptcy. Id.
66
Power, supra note 6, at 2709-10. Under this approach, if banks were
continuing to receive interest payments in a timely fashion, they could continue to
carry the sovereign notes as assets on their balance sheets and avoid bankruptcy. Id. at
2710; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1057.
67
Creditors with heavy exposure to the crisis were more willing to provide
gap financing for two principal reasons. First, like other creditors, bridge loans would
ensure that they could maintain sovereign loans as an asset on their balance sheets.
Since these creditors were more heavily exposed to the crises in the region, their
prospects for bankruptcy were more acute than those of minor participants. Similarly,
these large lenders wanted to maintain good working relationships with the
sovereigns. In many cases, the banks looked forward to developing new relationships
with local businesses and opening up retail banks in the sovereign nations. See Fisch &
Gentile, supra note 12, at 1058-60.
68
Free-riding creditors were a potential problem if larger banks provided the
entire financing necessary to avoid default. Id. at 1060. Under this scenario, sovereign
debtors would have sufficient funds to make interest payments on all their outstanding
notes. Consequently, less-exposed creditors would receive the benefit of timely interest
payments without having to incur the costs and additional exposure required by
providing gap financing. To secure full compliance, members of bank advisory
committees were assigned to oversee smaller banks within their geographical region.
Id. at 1060-61. Because smaller banks sought to grow and develop their working
relationships with other financial institutions, larger lenders would threaten
international and domestic market isolation if the smaller banks failed to participate in
the restructuring of sovereign debt. Id. at 1061.
69
Such “programs usually involve[d] cutting public spending, devaluing the
national currency to stimulate exports and reducing imports.” Burton Bollag, U.N.
Critical of I.M.F. Austerity Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1989, at D7.

2010]

THE SOVEREIGN DEBT DILEMMA

915

additional financing from all of its current lenders.70 Because of
these collective pressures, between 1982 and 1984 commercial
banks successfully restructured over forty loan agreements
with more than thirty different countries.71 While the
comparatively homogenous views of syndicate bank lenders
reduced creditor coordination problems and facilitated the
efficient rescheduling of sovereign debt, the subsequent rise of
bond financing in the mid-1980s presented new collective
action challenges that threatened to hinder the successful
restructuring of sovereign obligations.72
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF A SECONDARY MARKET IN
SOVEREIGN DEBT

A.

Beginnings of a Secondary Market: Inter-Bank Swaps
and Brady Bonds

Although the extension of bridge loans by bank advisory
committees and multilateral institutions73 helped to
temporarily stave off losses from debtor nations,74 several years
of cyclical restructuring fatigued creditors, and as a result
many institutions opted out of the process.75 As the crisis
continued to worsen, a secondary market in sovereign debt
began to emerge.76 Initially, this market consisted entirely of
inter-bank swaps,77 but as the sovereign debt crisis

70

Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1061.
Id. at 1063.
72
Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 20-21.
73
In 1985, at the World Bank Meeting in Seoul, South Korea, United States
Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker III proposed a plan whereby multinational
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank would extend an additional $9 billion in
loans to debtor states. Under the terms of the plan, borrowing nations would adopt
austerity measures in exchange for the funds. To some observers, the differences
between the Baker Plan and the private restructuring organized by bank advisory
committees were minimal. Santos, supra note 58, at 76-77.
74
Id.
75
Development Committee, Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of
Governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, A Strategy for
Restoration of Growth in Middle-Income Countries That Face Debt-Servicing
Difficulties 12-13 (1986), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/02/15/000178830_98101901582392/Rendered/PDF/
multi_page.pdf.
76
Sylvester, supra note 59, at 272.
77
Power, supra note 6, at 2715.
71
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deteriorated, banks began to trade their foreign loan assets for
cash.78
After several years of accumulating cash from sovereign
loan exchanges, many banks had attained a level of loan-loss
reserves that could sustain substantial write-off losses from
sovereign notes.79 Soon thereafter, it became clear to lenders
that the principal on sovereign loans would not be repaid at
“any time in the foreseeable future.”80 To reduce the debt
burden on commercial banks, United States Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady announced a plan to “‘securitize’
sovereign debts by converting loan obligations into bonds.”81
Under the Brady Plan, syndicated bank loans were pooled
together and exchanged for Brady Bonds guaranteed by United
States Treasury Bills.82 After repackaging, the bonds were sold
in the public markets and the proceeds used to satisfy the
sovereign’s outstanding debt.83 Importantly, this securitization
78

Even though it was highly unlikely that the sovereign debts would be ever
be fully repaid, the secondary market became quite popular with some investors. Id. at
2716. At first, this market was principally composed of large corporate investors
seeking debt-for-equity swaps.
In a debt-for-equity swap, an investor approaches a large debtor nation and
expresses an interest in investing in an industry or specific business. The
investor proposes to buy outstanding debt from a specific creditor or on the
open market for a fraction of the face amount of the outstanding loan. The
investor then sells the outstanding loan to the debtor nation for the face
amount or for a discounted amount of local currency . . . . The investor then
uses the sale proceeds to buy an equity stake in the local business, and makes
further capital investment.
Sylvester, supra note 59, at 272. But as lenders increasingly tried to exit from the
unraveling sovereign debt market, they rapidly reduced the price of their sovereign
loan assets. Rory Macmillan, supra note 56, at 328. Given the availability of fire sale
prices, investors with no interest in equity swaps began to purchase the heavily
discounted notes. Power, supra note 6, at 2718. Even if the debtor only paid back a
fraction of the loan’s face value, an investor could realize a potentially large profit.
Macmillan, supra note 33, at 328. Similarly, because interest continued to accrue on
the face value of the notes, interest payments alone could yield “an above-market rate
of return.” Power, supra note 6, at 2719.
79
Power, supra note 6, at 2719.
80
Miller, supra note 6 at 685. By 1989, “the pretense of keeping . . . [the]
loans on the books at face value could not longer be maintained.” Macmillan, supra
note 56, at 313.
81
Power, supra note 6, at 2720. Under the so-called “Brady Plan,” commercial
banks agreed to partially forgive sovereign debt obligations “in exchange for both a
commitment on the part of the debtors to adopt specified reforms designed to achieve
sustainable growth . . . and greater assurances of the collectability of the debt.” Fisch &
Gentile, supra note 12, at 1067.
82
Miller, supra note 6 at 685.
83
Power, supra note 6, at 2720. The securitization of sovereign lending was
quite popular with the market. Accordingly, within five years of initiating the Brady
Plan, “‘more than half of the affected debt stock had been traded in the hands of non-
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process replaced debts owed to commercial banks with
obligations to a group of individual bondholders.84 As a result of
the Brady Plan, sovereign financing “shifted” from the banking
business to the securities markets85 and, although the
techniques have changed,86 the securitization of debt remains
the principle means of sovereign lending today.87
B.

The Emergence of the Holdout Problem

Unlike the homogenized bank syndicates of the 1970s
and 1980s, post-Brady bondholders are diverse.88 Whereas
“[b]ank lenders are repeat players, constrained to cooperate
with one another,”89 groups of bondholders constantly change as
the securities are bought and sold in the market.90 Similarly,
the vast majority of sovereign bondholders lack any
relationship with the debtor, because they became creditors
through secondary trading.91 In the absence of a rapport with
either the sovereigns or with each other, bondholders do not
feel the same pressures to “compromise their . . . claims” or
share sacrifice.92 Instead of investing with a common purpose,
the liquid secondary market aggregates investors93 with vastly
divergent short-term and long-term goals.94 Given the relative
anonymity among them,95 there is little collective pressure to
cooperate.96 Consequently, sovereign bondholders pose a
collective action problem whereby holdout creditors can derail a

bank investors.’” Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 261 (quoting Lee C. Buchheit,
Sovereign Debtors and Their Bondholders, in UNITAR TRAINING PROGRAMMES ON
FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: SOVEREIGN DEBTORS AND THEIR BONDHOLDERS 7).
84
Power, supra note 6, at 2719. For the syndicated bank lenders,
securitization enabled them to escape from the sovereign debt market. Fisch & Gentile,
supra note 12, at 1067.
85
Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 261.
86
In the past ten years, sovereign lending has moved from Brady Bonds to
other types of bond instruments. See Miller, supra note 6, at 687.
87
Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 261.
88
Id.
89
Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 20.
90
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1071.
91
Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 261.
92
Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013.
93
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1071.
94
Id.
95
Ahdieh, supra note 44, at 704.
96
Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 261.
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potentially successful restructuring.97 It is this tyranny of the
minority that poses the sovereign debt dilemma.
1. The Unanimous Action Requirement and the Vulture
Fund Holdouts
Currently, the United States dominates the market for
sovereign bond issuances, and New York law governs the
majority of U.S.-issued sovereign bonds.98 Until Mexico’s
sovereign bond issuance in 2003, the vast majority of these
bonds incorporated unanimous action clauses (the “UACs”).99
Under a UAC, any alteration to a bond’s repayment terms
cannot be effectuated without the unanimous consent of all
bondholders.100 As a result, small factions of minority creditors
can derail a widely approved restructuring by withholding
their support.101
Along with the disruptive power of minority
bondholders, the creation of a secondary market in sovereign
debt also brought about the rise of “[f]unds specializing in
distressed assets.”102 Generally, these “vulture funds” purchase
deeply discounted sovereign debt on the secondary market103
and later attempt to collect on their claim in full.104 Although
97

Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013.
Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 259. Historically, most sovereign
financing activity took place in European capital markets. However, with the onset of
World War I in 1914 and the subsequent global depression, sovereign lending shifted
west. As the dominant capital market in the United States, New York emerged as the
new leader in sovereign finance. By the time the credit markets thawed in the 1970s,
New York had already established itself as the center of the sovereign financing
establishment, a position it maintains to this day. BORENSZTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at
74-76.
99
Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013-14. In part, the use of UACs in sovereign
bonds can be traced to the United States’ implementation of the Trust Indenture Act of
1939. Pursuant to the Act, corporate bonds issued in the United States were required
to incorporate UACs. Although the Act did not apply to sovereign bonds, commentators
have noted that the inclusion of UACs in sovereign financing contracts may simply be
the result of “drafting momentum.” Buchheit & Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the
Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1329-30 (2002).
100
Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013-14.
101
Brenneman, supra note 54, at 680.
102
Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 254.
103
Id. As a business model, the vulture fund structure can reap significant
rewards. In one case, Elliott Associates, a New York-based fund, earned over 494% on a
single investment in Peruvian debt. See id. at 258.
104
Id. at 262. While champerty laws prevent a third party from purchasing a
secondary debt with the sole intention of immediately litigating the claim to obtain full
recovery, sovereigns have resoundingly failed in their attempt to combat vulture funds
through champerty statutes. See James Thuo Gathii, The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan
Contracts and Its Origins in Enforcement Litigation, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251,
98
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there is usually no reasonable expectation that the debt will be
fully repaid,105 vulture funds “refuse to participate” in the
restructuring process106 because they are immune to the “peer
or regulatory” pressures that permeate syndicated bank
lending.107 As a result, these funds circumvent traditional
sovereign debt collection procedures and utilize litigation to
obtain the full face value of their claims.108
For a bond issued with UACs, the vulture fund
litigation strategy poses substantial problems for the
restructuring process.109 Since an amendment to repayment
terms cannot take effect without all outstanding bondholders
agreeing to the alteration, the sovereign debtor has incentives
to make side payments to any recalcitrant creditors.110 In doing
so, the sovereign debtor inadvertently encourages future
holdouts.111 Not only does a holdout receive the benefit of a side
payment, it may also continue to pursue legal remedies to
recover on the full face value of its claim.112 If such litigation
proves successful, it depletes the total funds available to satisfy
the claims of other similarly-situated creditors.113 Thus, instead
of promoting an orderly distribution of assets, the ability of a
vulture fund to derail the restructuring process encourages the
financial butchering of a sovereign’s foreign exchange
reserves.114 “[A] single default” can activate cross-default
clauses in other debt instruments and quickly flood the
sovereign in an unexpected “avalanche of redeemed debt.”115
Even if litigation proves to be unsuccessful, the unanimity
requirements of a UAC provision allow a single holdout to
311-12 (2006); see also Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 381 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that the New York champerty statute “is not violated when . . . the
accused party’s ‘primary goal’ is . . . [the] satisfaction of a valid debt and its intent is
only to sue absent full performance.”).
105
See generally Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1044.
106
Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 254, 263.
107
Id. at 262.
108
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1045. The litigation by some vulture
funds has become increasingly aggressive. In the case of the Republic of Congo, vulture
funds have attempted to collect on claims by attaching assets held by United States
corporations doing business with the nation. See generally, Lippert, supra note 41.
109
See Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013-15; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12,
1045-46; Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 262-63.
110
Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 259-60.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 260-61
115
Id. at 260.
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bring the entire restructuring process to a halt during the
pendency of the suit.116 Although these holdouts may provide
valuable benefits to the sovereign financing process,117 they can
also thwart a potentially successful restructuring118 and impose
heavy burdens on the citizenry of the debtor nation.119
Consequently, holdout bondholders can obstruct the efficient
restructuring of sovereign obligations and therefore create the
sovereign debt dilemma.120
2. Inability of Public Institutions to Solve the Sovereign
Debt Crisis
In 2002, to combat the efficiency costs of the holdout
problem, Anne Krueger of the International Monetary Fund
called for the creation of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (the “SDRM”) under the auspices of the IMF.121
Based on Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code,122
the SDRM sought to ensure the “orderly . . . and rapid
restructuring of . . . debt while protecting asset values and
creditors’ rights.”123 However, the plan ran into problems as
soon as it was announced. On the one hand, debtor-states
criticized the SDRM for its infringement on national
sovereignty and its potential to increase the cost of credit.124 On
the other hand, lenders argued that a uniform means to
restructure sovereign debt would reduce the number of
potential investors.125 Most importantly, however, the United
States disapproved of any global regime to effect sovereign debt
116

Dickerson, supra note 4, at 1013-14.
According to Professors Fisch and Gentile, “[h]oldout creditors . . . serve as
a check on opportunistic defaults and onerous restructuring terms.” Moreover, the
enforcement of debt obligations by the judiciary “enhances the operation of the
sovereign debt market by lowering the cost of financing to sovereign debtors and
increasing the value of the obligation to creditors.” Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at
1112.
118
Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 6, at 254.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 262 (quoting, G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy,
56 BUS. LAW 635, 637-38 (2001)).
121
KRUEGER, supra note 15, at 1, 21.
122
Id. at 1, 4.
123
Id. at 1, 4. The SDRM was modeled closely on Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings in the United States. See id. at 21.
124
Brenneman, supra note 54, at 677-78.
125
Arturo C. Porzecanski, A Critique of Sovereign Bankruptcy Initiatives: The
IMF and G7 Should Curb Financial Assistance to Countries in Trouble, BUS. ECON.,
Jan. 2003, at 39, 44.
117
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restructuring.126 Accordingly, in April 2003, United States
Treasury Secretary John W. Snow stated that it was “neither
necessary nor feasible to continue working on the SDRM.”127
Given the resistance of the United States and the investment
community to any “statutory bankruptcy-like process,”128 the
SDRM proposal was placed on hold.129 Today, any prospect for
the establishment of a formal nation-state restructuring regime
appears to be dead.130
In the debate leading up to the demise of the SDRM,
Treasury Secretary John W. Snow noted that “a contractual
approach . . . would help promote a more orderly restructuring
process . . . [because] [t]he source of . . . [the] problem . . . lies in
the relationships and agreements . . . [between] debtors and
their creditors.”131 Given the prevalence of UACs prior to 2003
and the resulting holdout problem, the IMF,132 the United
States,133 and the Group of 10 (the “G-10”),134 advocated for a full
transition from unanimous action clauses to collective action
clauses in sovereign financing contracts. Through the use of
CACs, it was believed that the collective action problem could
be mitigated, since a supermajority vote could bind a minority
of holdout creditors.135
126

John W. Snow, U.S. Sec’y of Treas., Statement at the Meeting of the
International Monetary and Financial Committee (Apr. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2003/imfc/state/eng/usa.htm.
127
Id.
128
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 715. Since adoption of the SDRM would
require an amendment to the IMF charter, the proposal would have required the
affirmative vote of U.S. representatives to the IMF. See Dickerson, supra note 4, at
1017.
129
Ahdieh, supra note 44, at 708.
130
Brenneman, supra note 54, at 679.
131
Snow, supra note 126.
132
International Monetary and Financial Committee, International Monetary
Fund, Communiqué, Dubai (Sept. 21, 2003) available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/cm/2003/092103a.htm.
133
Ahdieh, supra note 44, at 708.
134
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, GROUP OF TEN, REPORT OF
THE G-10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES 3-6 (2002) [hereinafter WORKING
GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf.
The “Group of 10” “refers to the group of countries that have agreed to participate in
the [IMF’s] General Arrangements to Borrow, a supplementary borrowing
arrangement that can be invoked if the IMF’s resources are estimated to be below
member’s [sic] needs.” INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, FACT SHEET, A GUIDE TO
COMMITTEES, GROUPS, AND CLUBS, 4 (2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/exr/facts/pdf/groups.pdf. The members of the G-10 are: Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Id.
135
BARRY EICHENGREEN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CRISIS
RESOLUTION: NEXT STEPS, 12-15 (2003).
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III.

THE MEXICAN AND URUGUAYAN MODELS

A.

The Mexican Model: Rise of the Collective Action
Clause136

[Vol. 75:3

In February 2003, Mexico became the first major issuer
to
incorporate
collective
action
clauses
(the
“CACs”) into sovereign bonds governed by New York law.137
Although other large capital markets had included CACs in
sovereign bonds for quite some time, the New York markets
had been hesitant to incorporate them.138 Unlike unanimous
action clauses, CACs enable a sovereign to amend certain
reserved matters139 on an outstanding bond by mere
supermajority vote.140 Both academics and multinational

136

Although other nations had previously incorporated collective action
clauses into their sovereign bond indentures, Mexico’s debt offering in 2003 was by far
the largest and most visible. See generally Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use
of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers 6 (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/international/
documents/gugiatti.pdf).
137
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 715; see also United Mexican States,
Prospectus, at 7 (Dec. 4, 2002).
138
These markets include London, Brussels, Luxemburg, and Tokyo. Hagan,
supra note 15 at 317-18; see also Elmar B. Koch, Essay, Collective Action Clauses: The
Way Forward, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665, 667 (2004). In various forms, collective action
th
clauses have been the norm under English law since the late 19 Century. Andrew G.
Haldane et al. Optimal Collective Action Clause Thresholds 9 (2004) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/workingpapers/
wp249.pdf). However, in the United States, the Trustee Indenture Act of 1939 prohibits
the use of CACs in corporate bonds. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77ppp (2004); see also Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97
YALE L.J. 232, 250 (1987). Due in large part to market practice, the prohibition on
CACs in the corporate context migrated to sovereign bonds. Bratton & Gulati, supra
note 7, 55. In 2002, the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses issued a report
calling for the inclusion of CACs in future sovereign bond agreements. WORKING
GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 134, at 3-4. In particular, the Working
Group noted that the inclusion of CACs would diverge from market practice in both
New York and Germany. Id.
139
In Mexico’s 2003 issuance, reserved matters included: “payment dates,
payment amounts, interest rates, . . . payment currency . . . governing law, specified
events of default, pari passu ranking, and submission to the jurisdiction of New York
courts.” Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 715-16.
140
Id. at 715. Within the realm of collective clauses, there is much diversity.
Although the general approval threshold was set by Mexico at 75%, some counties,
such as Brazil, have required up to 85% approval. Likewise, though the majority of
collective action clauses measure the voting base as the percentage of all outstanding
bondholders, other nations have provided that the voting base will only consist of those
holders who are present at a bondholder meeting. Similarly, other issues arise when
the issuing nation or a state-owned entity is a holder of its own bonds. To combat the
potential of undue influence in the approval process, most indentures have
incorporated disenfranchisement clauses that prevent the state or entity from voting
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institutions alike view CACs as “the most critical component”
of curbing disruptive holdout litigation.141 Since a supermajority
of bondholders can impose new repayment terms on
recalcitrant holdout creditors,142 CACs are an effective restraint
on the “tyranny of the minority” problem.143 To address the new
risk of the majority abusing its bargaining power at the
expense of minority bondholders,144 heightened approval
thresholds may be utilized.145 Not surprisingly, CACs have been
widely regarded as a necessary but potentially insufficient
means to achieve the efficient restructuring of sovereign debt.146
Pursuant to Mexico’s 2003 bond issuance, three-fourths
of bondholders can ratify an amendment to certain reserved
matters, such as repayment terms.147 To curb investor concerns
that the English quorum approach148 would interfere with
majority bondholder rights, the Mexican issuance provided for
an approval threshold based on the total principal remaining
on all outstanding bonds.149 In addition to CACs, Mexico also
incorporated a disenfranchisement clause.150 As one of the

on matters that require majority approval. Id. at 719-22; see also WORKING GROUP ON
CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 131, at 1-6; Brenneman, supra note 54, at 681.
141
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 134, at 3.
142
Brenneman, supra note 54, at 681; see also supra Part II.
143
Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 99, at 1325 (quoting FRANCIS B. PALMER,
COMPANY PRECEDENTS 271 (2d ed. 1881)).
144
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1094-95.
145
The approval threshold represents the percentage of bondholders that
must accept an amendment to the bond’s repayment terms. WORKING GROUP ON
CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 134, at 4. In its contractual reform
recommendations, the G-10 Working Group suggested that a 75% threshold would
provide optimal benefits. Id. On the one hand, a higher threshold would increase the
probability of holdout litigation. Id. On the other hand, too low a threshold may enable
majority abuse of minority bondholders. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1094-95.
Initially, investors in the United States were hesitant to accept this change out of a
concern that the threshold represented the percentage of holders actually present at a
bondholders’ meeting. WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at
4. To address this concern, the G-10 recommended that the threshold percentage be
based on the total principal remaining on all outstanding bonds. Id.
146
See generally, WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note
1384, at 3-7 (noting several recommendations to thwart holdouts in sovereign debt
restructuring).
147
United Mexican States, Prospectus, at 7 (Dec. 4, 2002); Galvis & Saad,
supra note 19, at 715.
148
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 4. Under
the English quorum approach, the approval threshold is based on the percentage of
bonds that are represented at the bondholders’ meeting, not the total number of bonds
outstanding. Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 719.
149
United Mexican States, Prospectus, at 7 (Dec. 4, 2002).
150
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 715.
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recommendations made by the G-10,151 disenfranchisement
clauses ensure that “[b]onds owned or controlled directly or
indirectly, by the Issuer or by any public sector instrumentality
of the Issuer . . . be disregarded and deemed not to be
[o]utstanding.”152 To curb concerns over potential vote
manipulation by the sovereign debtor,153 such provisions limit
the ability of a sovereign to distort the outcome of a proposed
debt restructuring by having bondholders vote against their
interests and in favor of the sovereign’s dictates.154 Although
Mexico limited the scope of its disenfranchisement clause,155 the
2003 issuance did prohibit bonds “owned directly or indirectly
by the [Mexican] federal government” from being counted in
any subsequent vote.156 Within a year of Mexico’s drastic
contractual reforms, both CACs and disenfranchisement
clauses became standard market practice in New York.157

151

In 2002, the G-10 formed a Working Group on Contractual Clauses “to
consider how sovereign debt contracts could be modified in order to make the resolution
of debt crises more orderly.” WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note
1384, at 1. To that end, in September of 2002, the Working Group issued a Report with
recommendations of contractual provisions to include in future sovereign financing
agreements. Id. For the Working Group, the objectives to be achieved were:
(i) to foster early dialogue, coordination, and communication among
creditors and a sovereign caught up in a sovereign debt problem;
(ii) to ensure that there are effective means for creditors and debtors to recontract, without a minority of debt-holders obstructing the process; and
(iii) to ensure that disruptive legal action by individual creditors does not
hamper a workout that is underway, while protecting the interest of the
creditor group.
Id.
152

Id. at 7.
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 720.
154
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 4.
155
The wording of the Mexican disenfranchisement clause is somewhat
narrower than that suggested by the G-10. Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 720. Under
the G-10’s wording, bonds “owned or controlled” by the sovereign would be prohibited.
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 17. Because Mexico
limited its provision to bonds “owned” by the federal government, this might be viewed
as more favorable to the sovereign debtor. Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 720.
Although most other sovereigns have followed Mexico’s lead, Uruguay adopted the G10’s recommendation word-for-word. Id.
156
Id.
157
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT TO THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON CRISIS RESOLUTION 5 (Apr.
20, 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cr/2004/eng/042004.pdf. In
less than a year after Mexico made its initial offering using CACs, over 11 countries,
including Chile, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Peru, Poland, Turkey and Venezuela,
incorporated CACs into their bonds governed by New York law. Id. at 3; see also Koch,
supra note 138, at 673. Indeed, although “there were no sovereign bonds with CACs on
153
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However, while the Mexican reforms were necessary, they were
insufficient to achieve effective creditor cooperation in the
absence of other coercive legal remedies.158
B.

The Uruguayan Model

In March 2003, Uruguay became the second country to
issue sovereign bonds incorporating CACs.159 Like the Mexican
model, Uruguay provided for both a 75% approval threshold on
reserved matters160 as well as an issuer disenfranchisement
provision.161 In addition to the incorporation of reforms adopted
from the Mexican model,162 the Uruguayan issuance also
included aggregation principles163 and a weak-trustee
structure.164 When compared to the Mexican reforms, the
Uruguayan additions appear to provide a superior means to
tackle several of the unresolved collective action problems.165
However, though the Uruguayan issuance appears to better
constrain the power of holdout creditors, it too fails to fully
address the collective action crisis of sovereign debt
restructuring.166

the New York market in 2002, in 2003 nearly 50% . . . of all new sovereign bonds under
New York law included CACs.” Id.
158
Robert B. Gray, Chairman, Int’l. Primary Mkt. Ass’n., Remarks at
UNCTAD Fourth Inter-Regional Debt Management Conference (Nov. 11, 2003),
available at http://www.efmagroup.net/getdoc/7514dd4b-4c34-4bc0-a266-f77648b5638a/
111103-RBG-UNCTAD-Speech-PDF.aspx.
159
República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 13-15; see also Galvis &.
Saad, supra note 19, at 717.
160
República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 36. Under the Uruguayan
issuance, reserved matters are very similar to those included under the Mexican model.
See supra note 139 and accompanying text. In Uruguay’s 2003 issue, reserved matters
include: payment dates, principal amounts, interest rates, currency, percentage of
votes required for taking any action, pari passu rankings, governing law, and
submission to New York courts’ jurisdiction. República Oriental, Indenture, supra note
21, at 38.
161
Unlike the Mexican issuance, the Uruguayan disenfranchisement clause
mirrored the G-10 recommendations exactly. Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 720; see
also República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 25.
162
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 717.
163
República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 36; see also Galvis &
Saad, supra note 19, at 722-23.
164
República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 15; see also Galvis &
Saad, supra note 19, at 724.
165
See infra Part III.B.1-2.
166
See infra Part IV.
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1. Aggregation
Under the Mexican model, voting provisions and
approval thresholds apply individually to each bond series, and
as a result, hinder the efficient restructuring of sovereign
debt.167 In the absence of aggregation, an issuer must seek
approval of a restructuring plan from the requisite percentage
of holders in each individual bond series.168 Consequently,
collective action problems arise both among bondholders within
the same class, as well as among the various series of bonds.169
As the number of series increases, or when different
modification provisions govern several different series of bonds,
this process becomes progressively complex.170 Similarly, the
repeated renegotiation of identical terms across multiple bond
series can prove to be incredibly inefficient to the sovereign
debt restructuring process.171 Without aggregation, a group of
rogue bondholders within a single series can hold up a
potentially successful restructuring.172 In an effort to ameliorate
these holdout creditors and move the restructuring process
forward, a sovereign may “purchase” the consent of dissenting
creditors through side payments, and inadvertently create a
run on the sovereign debtor’s assets.173 Moreover, even
167

See Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722-23. A single bond issuance may
incorporate multiple series of bonds. For example, after the debt crisis of 2001, Argentina
had to restructure 152 different bonds, issued in 14 different countries, denominated in
seven different currencies, and subject to eight different governing laws. Dr. Guillermo
Nielsen, Argentine Republic Sec’y of Finance, Speech at Dubai on Argentina’s Restructuring
Guidelines (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.argentinedebtinfo.gov.ar/documentos/
discurso_gn_dubai_con_diap_english.pdf.
168
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 3.
169
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722.
170
David A. Skeel, Jr., Review Essay, Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It
All?, 52 EMORY L. J. 417, 422-23 (2003). For example, an issuer could experience
significant problems if one series of bonds is governed by CACs and another series has
incorporated UACs.
171
Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Is Aggregation a Problem for Sovereign
Debt Restructuring? 1 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, available at,
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=801485); see also INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, LEGAL DEPARTMENT, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN DEBT—
ASSESSING THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND FEASIBILITY OF AGGREGATING CLAIMS 8 (2003)
(available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/090303.pdf).
172
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1094. The success of such a holdout
strategy will ultimately depend on whether the bonds incorporate UACs or CACs.
LEGAL DEPARTMENT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE RESTRUCTURING OF
SOVEREIGN DEBT—ASSESSING THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND FEASIBILITY OF AGGREGATING
CLAIMS 8 (2003).
173
Eichengreen & Mody, supra note 171, at 3. Under the United States
Bankruptcy Code, private debtors and creditors can avoid this outcome because of the
effect of the automatic stay (which halts attempts by creditors to collect on their debt
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assuming that a change in repayment terms could be
effectuated across multiple series of bonds, the size of a single
holdout’s stake may be large enough to make the entire
restructuring meaningless.174
To address these efficiency issues and conform to the
contractual recommendations of the G-10,175 Uruguay became
the first sovereign to incorporate aggregation principles that
provide for the cram down modification of reserved matters
across multiple series of bonds.176 Under this provision, an
amendment to repayment terms can be imposed against
multiple bond series.177 Specifically, cram down can occur if the
proponents of the modification obtain the support of “[h]olders
of not less than 85% in aggregate principal amount of the
Outstanding Debt Securities of all Series affected by that
Modification (taken in aggregate) . . . and [h]olders of not less
than 66-2/3% in aggregate principal amount of the Outstanding
Debt Securities of that Series (taken individually).”178 When
combined with Uruguay’s 75% approval threshold CAC,179
aggregation allows the issuer to impose repayment term
amendments on a one-third-minority holdout.180
Most importantly, the incorporation of an aggregation
clause encourages the type of collaboration and shared sacrifice
that was commonplace during the era of syndicated bank
lending.181 Because of cram down, aggregation permits the
during the pendency of the case) and avoidable preference provisions (which void
transactions that were made on the eve of filing the bankruptcy petition). 11 U.S.C.
§§ 362, 547 (2005).
174
For example, if the holdout was the cause of the sovereign’s financial crisis.
175
Although the G-10 Working Group did “not [focus] on the technicalities of
[aggregation provisions] in any detail,” their 2002 report did note that such clauses
have “a great deal of potential” and “[merit] further exploration.” WORKING GROUP ON
CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 138, at 6.
176
Alinna Arora & Rodrigo Olivares Caminal, Rethinking the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Approach, 9 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 629, 663-64 (2003).
177
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722.; see also WORKING GROUP ON
CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6-7.
178
República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at, 36; see also Galvis &
Saad, supra note 19, at 722.
179
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 723.
180
By providing for aggregation, the Uruguayan model “effectively reduces”
the approval threshold “from 75% to two-thirds.” Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 723.
For example, under CAC with a 75% approval threshold, a minority faction of one-third
of outstanding bondholders in a single series can block any amendment to reserved
matters for that series. With aggregation, however such holdouts have less power. If
the proponents of a reserved matter modification can obtain the approval of 85% of the
aggregate principle of all outstanding series, the amendment can be crammed down on
a single series with no more than one-third holdouts.
181
See supra Part I.B.
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issuer to focus on areas of collective agreement across multiple
bond series.182 Similarly, the threat of cram down encourages
the holders of different bonds to work together to arrive at a
settlement that is jointly advantageous.183 With the presence of
a highly liquid secondary market, moreover, recalcitrant
bondholders remain free to avoid what they may deem as
inequitable concessions by selling their bonds in the open
market.184 As a result, the Uruguay model promotes and fosters
collaboration among creditors while providing an avenue for
those who wish to opt out of the process.185
2. Fiscal Agency and Trust Structures
While collective action clauses make the restructuring of
sovereign debt somewhat easier, they only solve a portion of
the holdout problem.186 Under both UACs and CACs, sovereign
bonds issued pursuant to New York law generally incorporate a
fiscal agency structure.187 Under this approach, each bondholder
retains an individual right to seek legal remedies against the
sovereign debtor in the event of default.188 Although direct legal
actions were at one time quite rare,189 litigation to collect
against sovereign debtors is increasing.190 In the absence of
“sharing clauses,”191 litigating creditors under both the Mexican
and the Uruguayan models do not have to divide legal awards

182
183
184
185
186

Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722.
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1090-95.
Id.
Id.
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1093-95; see also Skeel, supra note 170,

at 423-24.
187

Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 723; see also WORKING GROUP ON
CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 138, at 6. Although sovereign bonds issued in
England have incorporated trust deeds for quite some time, sovereign bonds in the
United States typically utilize a fiscal agent. WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL
CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1102.
188
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT TO THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON CRISIS RESOLUTION 10 n.16
(Apr.
20,
2004)
[hereinafter
IMF,
PROGRESS REPORT],
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cr/2004/eng/042004.pdf.
189
Bratton & Gulati, supra note 7, at 34.
190
IMF, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 188, at 13.
191
For example, in the event that a court awards a litigating bondholder a
“disproportionate” judgment, a sharing clause may require that bondholder to turn
over any overpayment to the fiscal agent for a pro rata distribution to other
bondholders. Although such clauses were common during the era of syndicated bank
lending, they are rarely found in sovereign bond financing. Lee C. Buchheit, Changing
Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause, 17 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 17, 17-18 (1998).
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pro rata with fellow bondholders.192 Because sovereign debt
restructuring qualifies as a “zero sum game,”193 litigation
becomes “infectious”194 as creditors race to seize a defaulting
sovereign’s assets.195 Accordingly, though the introduction of
CACs and aggregation principles begin to address the holdout
problem, civil suits by dissenting bondholders continue to
reduce both the net pool of assets available to other creditors as
well as the potential for a successful restructuring of the
sovereign’s outstanding debt.196
Under the Mexican model, the fiscal agent is a relatively
weak entity that controls merely the distribution of payments
and simple forms of interaction between the issuer and the
bondholders.197 As an agent of the sovereign debtor, the fiscal
agent does not represent the interests of the bondholder class.198
Pursuant to most Fiscal Agency Agreements,199 the fiscal agent
“acts solely . . . for the issuer and does not have any fiduciary
relationship to the bondholders.”200 As a result, the fiscal agent
has very limited bondholder duties.201 In most cases, these
obligations are confined to: giving notice of specified events,
assembling a bondholder meeting if petitioned by the requisite
percentage of bondholders, and appointing a chairperson at the
bondholder meeting.202 Given that the fiscal agent has no power
to file suit against the sovereign debtor,203 and that the creditors
retain an individual right to litigate on their claims,204 the fiscal
agency structure is ineffective in preventing disruptive
litigation on the part of holdout creditors.205

192

Brenneman, supra note 54, at 680.
Buchheit, supra note 191, at 18. In other words, the sovereign’s assets that
are available to satisfy bondholder debt are limited. Therefore, as one creditor collects
on its claim, another creditor is left with fewer assets to satisfy its claim.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1093-95 .
197
Macmillan, supra note 33, at 65-66.
198
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1102 .
199
The Fiscal Agency Agreement is the controlling document that governs the
sovereign debtor and fiscal agent relationship. Macmillan, supra note 56, at 341.
200
Id. at 341-42.
201
Id. at 341.
202
Id.
203
See also Working Group on Contractual Clauses, Group of Ten, Report of
the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses (2002), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf.
204
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1102.
205
Id. at 1103.
193
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To avoid some of the collective action and efficiency
problems inherent in multiple civil suits,206 the Uruguayan
model incorporates a weakened trustee structure instead of the
fiscal agency model.207 Although the trustee structure does not
preclude individual bondholders from filing suit to recover
outstanding amounts payable,208 the trustee does have the
power to initiate legal action on behalf of the bondholder
class.209 Accordingly, in the event of a default, the trustee is an
“identifiable leader” to coordinate collective bondholder
action.210 Similarly, when engaged in litigation, the trustee acts
for the benefit of the entire bondholder class and distributes
any resulting award pro rata.211 In accordance with G-10
recommendations,212 the trustee is also responsible for
gathering and distributing financial information concerning
the sovereign debtor in the event of a debt restructuring.213 Yet,
while the Uruguayan trustee structure plays a more prominent
role in addressing the holdout problem, the model fails to
206

See supra Part II.B.
República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 17;, see also Part IV.
Uruguay was the first nation to utilize an Indenture Trustee in a New York sovereign
financing agreement. Galvis &. Saad, supra note 19, at 724. In addition, by
incorporating a weak trustee structure, the success of Uruguay’s issuance also
demonstrated a market willingness to move away from the traditional fiscal agency
model.
208
In particular, if the Republic fails to make payments when due, individual
bondholders can sue to recover. República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 15; see
also Arora & Caminal, supra note 176, at 663; Galvis &. Saad, supra note 19, at 724.
209
The trustee can initiate such action on the request of 25% of outstanding
bondholders. República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 15. Pursuant to the
indenture, “the Trustee, in its own name . . . shall be entitled and empowered to
institute any action or proceedings at law or in equity for the collection of . . sums . . .
due and unpaid.” Id. at 13. Some academics suggest that the primary benefits of a
trustee could be achieved without shifting from the fiscal agent structure. By
“concentrat[ing] ‘the right to sue’ in a single representative of bondholders” the same
benefits could be obtained. Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 723-25.
210
Macmillan, supra note 56, at 341.
211
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 722-24.
212
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 3.
213
Such information includes:
207

(i) a description of the economic or financial circumstances that . . . explain
the request for the proposed Modification;
(ii) if the Republic . . . [has] entered into a standby, extended funds, or
similar program with the International Monetary Fund . . . ; and
(iii) a description of the Republic’s proposed treatment of its other major
creditor groups . . . .
República Oriental, Indenture, supra note 21, at 37; see also, Galvis & Saad, supra note
19, at 722; Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action is Changing Sovereign Debt, 22 INT’L
FINANCIAL L. REV., 19 (2003).
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prevent rogue litigation,214 and as a result, collective action
problems remain.
IV.

THE SUPER TRUSTEE SOLUTION

In 2002, when the G-10 reported on contractual
solutions to the sovereign debt crisis, it recommended both the
inclusion of CACs215 and the incorporation of a “super” trustee
structure.216 Under the “super” trustee model, bondholders
generally do not have the right to bring legal actions in their
individual capacity.217 Rather, the authority to file suit against
the sovereign debtor usually lies solely with an indenture
trustee.218 As a result, litigation can only be brought on the
trustee’s own initiative or upon the direction of a specified
percentage of outstanding bondholders.219 Similar to the
Uruguay model, if any resulting legal action proves successful,
the trustee, as representative of the entire bondholder class,
must share any award pro rata.220
For the better part of the last century, the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 (the “Act”) has mandated a trust
indenture structure for public corporate bonds.221 Under the
Act, the trustee is an agent of the bondholders and owes to
them a duty of good faith.222 Although the trustee’s duties are
limited outside of the default scenario,223 the trustee does
ensure compliance with the terms of the indenture even when
the debtor is paying as required.224 If a debtor defaults,

214

Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 723-24. Although the Uruguayan Trustee
curbs holdout litigation on accelerated amounts (those payments not yet due), it fails to
effectively control individual legal actions for past amounts due. Id. at 724 n.23.
215
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 3.
216
Other recommendations included: revised provisions for calling bondholder
meetings; majority enforcement of acceleration clauses; provisions requiring
appropriate information to be disseminated to bondholders; and disenfranchisement
provisions from the issuer of the bonds. See id. at 2-7.
217
IMF, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 157, at 10 n.16.
218
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6-7.
219
IMF, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 157, at 10 n.16.
220
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6-7.
221
Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade, & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance
Structure For Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 485 (1999). In addition, the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 explicitly exempts governments, both domestic and foreign, from
its requirements. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77ddd(a)(6) (1998); see also Macmillan, supra note 56,
at 339-41.
222
Macmillan, supra note 586, at 339-41.
223
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1105.
224
Macmillan, supra note 586, at 339-40.
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however, the trustee’s duties become much more complex.225 In
accordance with the Act, the debtor’s default triggers the
trustee’s fiduciary duties to the bondholder class.226 In addition,
the trustee is the only entity that is able to accelerate principal
amounts due on outstanding bonds.227 Unlike a fiscal agent, the
trustee acts as a fiduciary for bondholders, and thus only the
trustee may file suit against the debtor.228 Unless the trustee
fails to comport with its fiduciary obligations, bondholders are
limited in the types of lawsuits they can bring.229 Consequently,
the Act both limits the ability of holdouts to pursue obstructive
litigation tactics and provides bondholders with a centralized
fiduciary to enforce the payment obligations of recalcitrant
corporate debtors.230
Although the Uruguayan model provides for an
indenture trustee with some control over the sovereign debt
restructuring process, it fails to solve the holdout dilemma,
because rogue creditors can continue to file adversary actions.231
By incorporating CACs and aggregation principles but failing
to preclude suits by individual bondholders,232 the model fails to
live up to its full potential.233 Under a “super” trustee approach
akin to that required by the Trust Indenture Act, the holdout
problem could be greatly curbed.234 Whereas CACs and
aggregation clauses in the Uruguay model prevent holdout
creditors from halting the restructuring process itself, the
problem of a race to the sovereign debtor’s assets remains.235 By
entrusting an individual or entity with exclusive power to file
suit for default, the “super” trustee structure prevents vulture
funds and rogue creditors from disrupting the restructuring
process with threats of costly and cumbersome litigation.236
Similarly, the pool of assets to be distributed among equally
225

Id. at 339-41.
Id.
227
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1104.
228
Id. at 1105. Although the Act provides that public, corporate bondholders
have an absolute right to sue for past amounts due (as opposed to accelerated
amounts), this provision could be removed from sovereign bond trustee indentures. See
Galvis & Saad, supra note 19, at 724 n.23.
229
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1105.
230
Id.
231
See Galvis & Saad, supra note 19 , at 723.
232
See id. at 723-25.
233
See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1094.
234
See id.
235
See id.
236
See WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6-7.
226
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situated bondholders is not raided, but distributed pro rata.237
In addition, the case law and legal theories that have been
applied to the trustee structure in the corporate context for
almost three-fourths of a century could easily be transplanted
to sovereign debt.238 Furthermore, fiduciary duties should curb
fears that a trustee will not be aggressive in defending
bondholders’ interests.239 Accordingly, the application of a
“super” trustee structure should be the next step in solving the
holdout crisis at the core of the sovereign debt dilemma.240
CONCLUSION
Although sovereign financing has undergone significant
contractual reforms over the past decade,241 these efforts have
generally failed to adequately address the inefficiencies created
by holdout strategies. In the absence of a global sovereign debt
restructuring regime, both creditors and debtors will need to
continue to rely on contractual methods to effectuate sovereign
Notwithstanding
the
laudable
debt
restructuring.242
243
improvements made by Mexico and Uruguay, additional
refinements are necessary. In particular, the sovereign
financing market should move towards the incorporation of a
super trustee indenture. With a trustee to coerce creditor
cooperation and ensure equitable treatment among
bondholders, the super trustee fills in the gaps left by the early
reforms. Therefore, the super trustee is necessary to curb the
holdout problem and finally extinguish the sovereign debt
dilemma.
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237

See id.
See Macmillan, supra note 33, at 65.
239
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 12, at 1107.
240
See WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 1384, at 6-7.
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See supra Part III.
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See supra Part II.B.2.
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See supra Part III.
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